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MUST THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES
ACT BAR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
CLAIMS?
Twice since 1980 United States courts have awarded judgments
(totalling $13,085,364) to alien victims of torture. The defendants
were also aliens. The torture occurred outside United States terri-
tory. While these cases imply that victims of international human
rights violations will find satisfaction in United States courts, this
Comment concludes that the internationally endorsed doctrine of
sovereign immunity, as codified by Congress in 1976, will bar fu-
ture judgments in favor of alien victims of torture. The Comment
proposes an amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
that would provide one of the few available means of redress for
these victims of international human rights violations.
INTRODUCTION
In 1984 the Central District Court of California, in Siderman de
Blake v. Argentina,1 awarded a $2.7 million judgment against the
government of Argentina for the torture of an Argentine citizen in
Argentina. The court based jurisdiction on the Alien Tort Claims
Act (ATCA),2 a seldom-used statute which establishes federal juris-
diction for torts committed by an alien in violation of international
law. 3 The Siderman court, following the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,4 found that torture in-
deed violates the ATCA's "law of nations" (international law) and
1. No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. 1984).
2. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976) [hereinafter cited as the
ATCA].
3. For the purposes of this Comment, "international law" is used synonymously
with the more antiquated phrase, "law of nations." For a definition of "law of nations",
see infra note 136.
4. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). The plaintiff was awarded $10,385,364 in dam-
ages. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 867 (1984).
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that the ATCA provides for suits between foreign plaintiffs and for-
eign defendants in United States courts.5 However, these two cases
are distinguishable in that the defendant in Siderman, Argentina,
was a sovereign nation, while the Filartiga defendant was a private
citizen. The court failed to address the possible sovereign immunity
defense for Argentina. Consequently, the result in Siderman is
questionable.
Traditionally, the defense of sovereign immunity is available to a
foreign government when acting as a public entity rather than in a
private capacity.6 This distinction is usually (and superficially) inter-
preted to mean that the state is held liable for its commercial acts,
but is immune from suit in all other situations.7 In 1976 the United
States codified a restrictive theory in the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act (Immunities Act).8 The Immunities Act purports to be the/.
exclusive means of obtaining jurisdiction over foreign states in
United States courts.9 Yet, the Siderman holding implies that the
ATCA functions concurrently with the Immunities Act as a means
of obtaining jurisdiction to bring suit against a sovereign in a United
States court. Thus, although Siderman appears to provide a mecha-
nism for foreign victims of torture to seek redress in American
courts, such a presumption is premature. The "exclusivity" of the
Immunities Act must first be determined.
If the Immunities Act supercedes the ATCA, the Immunities Act
must be analyzed to determine whether it is amenable to the torture
cause of action. This Comment explores this judicial inquiry con-
cluding that the Immunities Act, as written, will bar future interna-
tional human rights claims. Further, this Comment analyzes policy
which would allow litigation of torture claims in United States
courts and proposes an amendment to the Immunities Act which
would provide a practical avenue of redress for the victims of inter-
national human rights violations.
5. Id. at 889. The court construed the ATCA and international law to allow a
foreigner to sue the former head of the Peruvian secret police in United States federal
court for torture inflicted in Peru.
6. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE REPORT].
7. Id. at 7. See generally, Singer, Abandoning Restrictive Sovereign Immunity:
An Analysis in Terms of Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1985).
8. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2), (4), 1391(0, 1441(d), 1602-1611
(1976) [hereinafter cited as the Immunities Act]. The Immunities Act went into effect
on January 19, 1977. See infra text accompanying note 27.
9. HOuSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 12.
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EXISTING AVENUES OF REDRESS FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
The Alien Tort Claims Act
The ATCA, enacted nearly 200 years ago as part of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, states: "The district court shall have original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 10
The ATCA has been used successfully as the basis for jurisdiction
only four times since its enactment." Of those cases, the two most
recent, Filartigal2 and Siderman,13 concerned the torture of alien
citizens.
The plaintiffs in Filartiga were the father and sister of Joelito Fi-
lartiga, a teenage Paraguayan boy, who was kidnapped and tortured
to death in Paraguay by the defendant, the Inspector General of Po-
lice in Asuncion, Paraguay.14 Plaintiffs alleged the boy was tortured
in retaliation for his father's criticism of the Paraguayan regime.1 5
In a provocative opinion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that "deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official au-
thority violates . . . the international law of human rights."18 The
court further held that jurisdiction is available for a suit by a foreign
plaintiff against a foreign defendant under the ATCA.17 While the
court required that the claim be characterized as official torture,
that is, under color of state law, the opinion did not discuss sovereign
immunity because Paraguay did not ratify the acts of Pena-Irala,
and because Pena-Irala himself was available in the United States
for service of process. 8
10. Now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).
I!. Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal.
1984); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (Jurisdiction over allegation
of official torture not ratified by official's state); Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md.
1961) (child custody dispute between two aliens; wrongful withholding of custody is a
tort and defendant's falsification of child's passport to procure custody violated interna-
tional law); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S. 1795) (No. 1607) (suit for restitution
of three slaves who were on board a Spanish ship seized as a prize of war; treaty with
France superseded international law; the ATCA could have been an alternative basis of
jurisdiction).
12. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
13. Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal.
1984).
14. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 878.
17. Id. at 889.
18. Id. See generally Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over Interna-
The most recent case, Siderman de Blake v. Argentina,a9 was
brought by a sixty-five year old resident of Argentina who was kid,
napped, held for a week, and tortured to persuade him to leave Ar-
gentina. The perpetrator was an official of the Argentine govern-
ment.20 The case resulted in a $2.7 million default judgment against
Argentina.21 Traditionally, Argentina would have an affirmative de-
fense under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. However, the
Siderman opinion failed to address this defense or offer an explana-
tion for basing jurisdiction outside the Immunities Act. There are
three possible explanations of the court's actions: first, Argentina
waived immunity by failure to respond to service of process; second,
Argentina waived immunity by signing various international human
rights agreements; or third, Argentina waived immunity by signing
several treaties prohibiting torture and agreeing to provide a national
forum for torture victims.
22
Whatever the district court's reasoning, the court presently is re-
considering the issue of foreign sovereign immunity sua sponte. The
United States Department of State has submitted a brief requesting
a rehearing of the Siderman case on the issue of the sovereign im-
munity of Argentina.23 The unique circumstances of Filartiga, mak-
ing suit against an individual torturer possible, are unlikely to occur
again.24 Invariably, sovereign states will be the defendant in future
suits for "official" torture (the cause of action as defined in Filar-
tiga),2 5 raising the defense of sovereign immunity in each case. Thus,
sovereign immunity will be the key issue in future international
human rights cases.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Historically, independent nations and their governments were free
from the threat of suit by the doctrine of absolute immunity. Chief
Justice Marshall described this doctrine in The Schooner Exchange
tional Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 106 (1981).
19. No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. 1984).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Brief of Plaintiffs in Support of Default Judgment, Siderman de Blake v. Ar-
gentina, No. 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. 1984).
23. Suggestion of Interest of the United States, Siderman de Blake v. Argentina,
No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. 1984).
24. Blum & Steinhardt, supra at note 18. See also Hassan, Panacea or Mirage?
Domestic Enforcement of International Human Rights Law: Recent Cases, 4 Hous. J.
INT'L LAW 13, 21 (1981).
25. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876. See e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1354 (1985). See generally Comment,
The Alien Tort Statute: United States Jurisdiction Over Acts Committed Abroad, 23
WM. & MARY L. REV. 103, 118-20 (1980).
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v. M'Fadden:28
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclu-
sive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.
Any restriction on it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply
a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an in-
vestment of that sovereign to the same extent in that power which could
impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete
power of a nation within its own territories must be traced up to the consent
of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.27
In the last decade, the United States joined most sovereign nations
(with the exception of the socialist countries) in adopting a more
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.28
The Immunities Act is a codification of the restrictive principle of
sovereign immunity. Under this theory, immunity is 'restricted to the
public acts (acta jure imperii) of foreign states; immunity is not
granted when a foreign state engages in private, usually commercial,
activities (acta jure questionis) .2" This theory conforms to the prac-
tice of most sovereign states and now is considered the accepted rule
of international law.30
The Immunities Act provides procedures for bringing suit against
a foreign government in United States courts. It also provides a list
of situations in which sovereigns cannot claim immunity.31 The Im-
munities Act denies immunity on claims which are based upon a sov-
ereign's commercial activity when conducted in the United States or
which have direct effects in the United States.32 If a foreign govern-
ment waives immunity, explicitly or implicitly, immunity is denied. 33
If a sovereign takes property in violation of international law, and
either that property, or the commercial activity of the sovereign own-
ing the property, is connected to the United States, immunity is de-
nied. 4 Immunity is also unavailable for a sovereign's tortious acts
committed within the United States.35 The Immunities Act further
provides that immunity is considered waived when a sovereign fails
26. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
27. Id. at 135.
28. HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 6-12.
29. Id. at 7.
30. Id. See also J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, CASE MATERIALS ON IN-
TERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS, 288-89, 301-02 (2d ed. 1981).
31. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1605 (1976).
32. Id. § 1605(a)(2).
33. Id. § 1605(a)(1).
34. Id. § 1605(a)(3).
35. Id. § 1605(a)(5).
to respond to service of process.36 Immunity under the Immunities
Act is also subordinated to previous international agreements.37
The Immunities Act makes no explicit provision for human rights
causes of action; 38 the legislative history does not propose liability for
public acts in any form. Nevertheless, in 1980 the D.C. District
Court attempted to hold the government of Chile liable for its public
act of ordering the assassination of the former Chilean Ambassador
to the United States while he was in the United States.40 The Immu-
nities Act also fails to provide explicitly for suits between a foreign
plaintiff and a foreign sovereign.41 However, in 1983 the Supreme
Court, in Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,42 accepted ju-
risdiction over a commercial cause of action between a foreign plain-
tiff and a foreign sovereign, requiring only that the substantive cause
of action fall within one of the Immunities Act's enumerated excep-
tions. Thus, it is possible the Immunities Act is open to further ex-
pansion, allowing human rights causes of action to proceed under
one of three provisions in the Act: 1) waiver by failure to respond to
service;43 2) waiver by ratification of a treaty prohibiting torture;44
or 3) waiver by ratification of other international agreements which
provide for international tribunals.45 Before addressing possible ave-
nues of redress for torture victims under the Immunities Act, the
exclusivity of the Immunities Act first must be considered.
Does the Immunities Act Supercede the ATCA?
The Immunities Act purports to set forth "the sole and exclusive
standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity
raised by foreign states before federal and state courts in the United
States. 146 Furthermore, United States case law predominantly sup-
36. Id. § 1608.
37. Id. § 1330(a).
38. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 39. The "purpose" section of the House
Report refers only to commercial disputes and ordinary private torts, such as automobile
accidents.
39. Id. at 7.
40. De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd 748.
F.2d 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied 105 S. Ct. 2656 (1985) (The District Court had
applied section 1605(a)(5) of the Immunities Act).
41. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1608 (1976).
42. 461 U.S. 480 (1983). This application of the Immunities Act followed a great
deal of debate. See, e.g., Note, Federal Question Jurisdiction over Actions Brought by
Aliens Against Foreign States, 15 CORN. INT'L L.J. 463, 487 (1982).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976).
44. Id. § 1605(a)(1).
45. Id. § 1330(a).
46. HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 12. In support of this language is an estab-
lished canon of statutory construction which provides that a more recent statute should
prevail when two statutes overlap or conflict. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton
Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907); see also AJ. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 2313 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1972). The Immunities Act is more recent than
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ports the exclusive use of the Immunities Act in establishing juris-
diction over a sovereign state."
While no case prior to Siderman has found jurisdiction under the
ATCA as an alternative to the Immunites Act, longshoremen previ-
ously have brought suits against sovereign defendants under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 in an attempt to retain their right to jury trial in
federal civil cases, since the Immunities Act provides for nonjury tri-
als only.48 In only two of these cases did the courts allow jurisdiction
to be based outside of the Immunities Act.49 The Second, Third, and
Fourth Circuits have held that the right to jury trial, in itself, does
not permit suit to be brought under section 1331, since the Immuni-
ties Act "constitutes the sole basis of federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion over foreign sovereigns and its entities."50IThe United States Department of State agreed with this conclu-
sion, submitting an amicus curiae brief to the Siderman court sug-
the ATCA and overlaps insofar as suits against sovereigns are concerned. The substan-
tive subjects of the two statutes, however, are inapposite. See infra notes 56-73 and ac-
companying text.
47. Most recently, the Supreme Court in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Ni-
geria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983), asserted repeatedly in dictum that the Immunities Act
must be applied by the district courts in every action against a foreign sovereign. The
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion through three controversial
opinions in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied 105 S.Ct. 1354-55 (1985). Survivors of victims of PLO terrorism could not sue
under the ATCA because, inter alia, the PLO is not a recognized nation and they could
not sue Libya because immunity is preserved for Libya under the Immunities Act. See
also Canadian Transp. Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Goar v.
Compania Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 688 F.2d 417, 420-22 (5th Cir. 1982); Williams v.
Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875, 880-81 (4th Cir. 1981); Jafari v. Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209, 215 (N.D. 11. 1982); McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
722 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1983); Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Although President Carter had already guaranteed Iran's immunity with the
executive order that ended the 1979 "hostage crisis," the courts in McKeel and Persinger
chose to further (and redundantly) hold that Iran was immune because our United
States Embassy in Tehran is not part of United States territory under section 1605(a)(5)
of the Immunities Act.
48. In the following cases, the longshoremen were deprived of their Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial, when the courts held that jurisdiction only could be had
under the Immunities Act in cases with foreign defendants: Ruggiero v. Compania
Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 639 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981); Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores,
S.A., 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981); Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 61 (4th
Cir. 1981); Jones v. Shipping Corp. of India, 491 F.Supp. 1260 (E.D. Va. 1980); Geveke
& Co. Int'l v. Kompania di Awa, 482 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Houston v. Mur-
mansk Shipping Co. 87 F.R.D. 71 (D. Md. 1980).
49. Two cases allowed suit under section 1331 against foreign defendants in order
to uphold plaintiffs' right to jury trial. Lonon v. Companhia de Navegacao, 85 F.R.D. 71
(E.D. Pa. 1979); Icenogle v. Olympic Airways, S.A., 82 F.R.D. 36 (D.D.C. 1979). How-
ever, neither of these cases were appealed.
50. Rex. v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1981).
gesting that "the court must apply and is limited to the provisions
under the FSIA [Immunities Act]."' 51 The State Department ex-
pressed concern that the government of Argentina might be politi-
cally offended by a contrary result. Argentina established friendly
relations with the United States after the time of Siderman's torture
and is now a recipient of United States financial assistance.5 2 How-
ever, the drafters of the Immunities Act intended to "leave immu-
nity decisions exclusively to the courts and to discontinue judicial
deference to 'suggestions of immunity' from the executive branch. 5 3
The Immunities Act's legislative history explains that immunity de-
cisions should no longer be swayed by foreign policy considerations
as they were prior to the Act, when the State Department, instead of
the courts, chose to grant or withhold immunity.5 4
In enacting the Immunities Act, Congress intended to take the
measure of justiciable substantive law out of the political realm. 55
However, did Congress also intend to simultaneously eliminate the
substantive law established by the drafters of the Constitution in
1789? It is presumed that the drafters of the ATCA intended to
avoid or mitigate international conflict by providing for the adjudica-
tion of international law violations.5 Where international law norms
have universal assent, their application cannot be barred by national
barriers or political motivations.5 The Immunities Act, however,
does not provide for the adjudication of these violations. The legisla-
tive history of the Immunities Act indicates that the drafters never
considered the remedies already existing under the ATCA for inter-
national law violations; nor did they indicate an intent to eliminate
those remedies.58
The Supreme Court has held that universally recognized norms of
international law should be the bases of suits in United States
courts.59 In Filartiga, the court held that "[t]he constitutional basis
for the Alien Tort Statute is the law of nations, which has always
been part of the federal common law."60 The court further held that
51. Suggestion of Interest of the United States, Siderman de Blake v. Argentina,
No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. 1984) at 8.
52. Id.
53. HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 12.
54. Id. at 12.
55. Id.
56. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 536 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
57. Id.
58. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 10.
59. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815). (Chief Justice Marshall
wrote that "the Court is bound by the law of nations which is part of the law of the
land."); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of
our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination").
60. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (1980).
[VOL. 23: 741. 1986] International Human Rights
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
official torture is a violation of international law because it is a uni-
versally recognized crime; the countries of the world have demon-
strated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, con-
cern. 61 If the Immunities Act is exclusive in establishing jurisdiction
over sovereigns, this effectively eliminates the adjudication claims of
official torture in United States courts.
6 2
Two fundamental principles of statutory construction argue that
the source of this substantive law, the ATCA, should be preserved.
First, a statute dealing with a narrow and specific subject is not
superceded by a later-enacted statute covering a more generalized
spectrum. 3 Second, a statute should not be construed so as to render
any part of it "inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant."
64
The specific subjects of international law violations, including human
rights violations, are not covered by the broad jurisdictional provi-
sions of the Immunities Act. Further, suits against sovereigns in the
United States are crucial to the viability of the ATCA. Many jurists
and scholars have argued that only sovereigns may and should be
sued as defendants under the ATCA.65 If this widely-held view was
adopted, the ATCA would be rendered completely impotent by the
Immunities Act. Half of the successful suits brought under the
ATCA were based on claims of official torture;6 6 exclusion of these
suits due to preemption by the Immunities Act would significantly
weaken the usefulness of the ATCA and render an important part of
the ATCA inoperative, superfluous, and void. In spite of the weighty
61. Id. at 888. (The court cites various multilateral human rights documents, the
constitutions of nations, and works of commentators and jurists to establish official tor-
ture as a violation of "customary" international law by the "general assent of civilized
nations." Id. at 881-85.)
62. See generally U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; ATCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1350; Blum
& Steinhardt, supra note 18.
63. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976), citing Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974). See also AJ. SUTHERLAND, supra note 46, §
23.15.
64. King v. Alaska State Hous. Author., 633 P.2d 256 (Ala. 1981); Indianapolis
Power & Light Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 687 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1982).
See also A.J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 46, § 46.06.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, Reporters' Notes § 34(2)
(1965); Hassan, supra note 24, at 19; Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied 429 U.S. 835 (1976); lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Brown-
lie, The Place of the Individual in International Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 435 (1964); Cohen
v. Hartman, 634 F.2d 318, 319 (5th Cir. 1981); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
A TREATISE 19 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955). See supra note 18 and accompanying
text. See also Comment, U.S.C. § 1350: A Legal Remedy for Torture in Paraguay? 69
GEo. L. J. 833 (1981).
66. See cases cited supra note 11.
authority arguing for the exclusive use of the Immunities Act, these
two statutes could coexist as alternative bases of jurisdiction over
sovereign states.67
Traditionally, the substantive and procedural aspects of a legisla-
tive act are treated separately. 68 Because the Immunities Act pur-
ports to provide a comprehensive scheme for actions against foreign
nations, it establishes exclusive procedures by which these suits may
be brought but enumerates only a limited number of controversies to
which the statute applies. Consequently, the Act is incomplete. Leg-
islation recently has been proposed to clarify certain substantive ele-
ments of the Immunities Act.69 Because the procedural and substan-
tive elements must be addressed separately, the Immunities Act may
provide an exclusive procedural guide for suits against foreign states,
while at the same time recognizing other substantive causes of action
which already exist under United States law.70 Consequently, juris-
diction could be based on any appropriate statute which addresses
the substantive violation at issue.7 1 This interpretation would allow
the ATCA to survive intact, protecting specified substantive rights
while providing a uniform mechanism for bringing suit under the
Immunities Act.72 In the absence of a more explicit command from
Congress, courts should continue to allow suits outside the Immuni-
ties Act when the ATCA's requirements are met.73
67. Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REV.
385 (1982) (Professor Kane, a law professor at the University of California, Hastings
College of the Law, is considered an authority on the Immunities Act. She is also the co-
author of C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE Civil
(2d ed. 1983)); see also Comment, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and International
Human Rights Agreements: How They Co-Exist, 17 U.S.F.L. REV. 71, 74 n.12 (1982)
citing, Comment, The Domestic Application of International Human Rights Law:
Evolving the Species, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 161 (1981); Paust, Human
Rights: From Jurisprudential Inquiry to Effective Legislation, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 227
(1981); HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: WHAT IT IS
AND How IT CAN BE USED IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1981).
68. Kane, supra note 67, at 387.
69. S. 1071, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). Senator Mathias recommended amend-
ments based on proposals adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Asso-
ciation in August 1984. For the most part, these amendments clarify the waiver of im-
munity by agreement to arbitrate. 131 CONG. REC. § 5363 (daily ed. May 3, 1985)
(statement of Sen. Charles Mathias).
70. Kane, supra note 67, at 393 ("Thus, a plaintiff suing a foreign government
may attempt to claim federal jurisdiction under any statutory base for which the require-
ments are met.")
71. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
72. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 13-14.
73. Kane, supra note 67, at 392 n.45 (Those courts allowing suit against sover-
eigns outside the Immunities Act did so because Congress was not explicit regarding
exclusivity).
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Is Immunity Waived by Silence?
If immunity from suit is waived when the sovereign fails to re-
spond to service, torture victims may prevail even though the suppos-
edly "exclusive" provisions of the Act do not include a human rights
cause of action, as occurred in Siderman.7 4 Section 1608 of the Im-
munities Act provides for default judgment against foreign sover-
eigns when claimants establish a claim or right to relief by evidence
satisfactory to the court.7 5 Congress intended that sovereign immu-
nity would act as an affirmative defense, 6 and courts repeatedly
have placed the burden of pleading and proving immunity on the
defendant state.7
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has declared that, even if a for-
eign state does not make an appearance, the court must determine
sua sponte if immunity is available under the Immunities Act.78 This
holding renders the default judgment provision of the Immunities
Act meaningless. Additionally, courts have set aside default judg-
ments made under the Immunities Act at the request of the United
States7 19 or the sovereign defendant,80 for determining post facto
whether the suit falls within one of the Immunity Act exceptions.8'
As previously noted, the Siderman court is reconsidering the default
judgment against Argentina, and the Department of State is request-
ing that it be set aside.82 Thus, recent precedent has all but disposed
of the "automatic immunity waiver by default" provisions of the Im-
74. Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal.
1984). (Although the court failed to refer to the Immunities Act, the finding was a de-
fault judgment as provided for under section 1608 of the Immunities Act).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976).
76. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 14. ("Sovereign immunity is an affirmative
defense which must be specially pleaded, [and] the burden will remain on the foreign
state to produce evidence in support of its claim of immunity.")
77. See e.g., Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1378 (5th
Cir. 1980); Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383, 389 n.16
(D.N.J. 1979); Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ala.
1982).
78. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1983)
("The statute [Immunities Act] must be applied by the district courts in every action in
a district court against a foreign sovereign . . . . At the threshold of every action in a
district court against a foreign state, therefore, the court must satisfy itself that one of
the exceptions applies.")
79. E.g., Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 596 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala.
1984); De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd 748 F.2d
790 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied 105 S.Ct. 2656 (1985).
80. E.g., Castro v. Saudi Arabia, 510 F. Supp. 309, 313 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
81. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
munities Act.
Do Human Rights Agreements Waive Immunity?
Victims of international human rights violations have two other
possible bases of redress under the Immunities Act.83 Section 1604
makes the Immunities Act "subject to existing international agree-
ments to which the United States is a party. .. ",84 and section
1605(a)(1), grants an exception to immunity where the foreign state
has waived its immunity either explicitly or implicitly.85 The plain-
tiffs in Siderman argued that both of these exceptions applied to Ar-
gentina.8 The availability of these exceptions is important not only
to the Siderman plaintiffs, but also to any torture victim attempting
suit in United States courts.
The first Immunities Act basis for human rights plaintiffs, section
1604, allows a previous international agreement to control, but only
when it is in "manifest" conflict with the Immunities Act. The legis-
lative history specifically states, "where the international agreement
is silent on a question of immunity, the bill would control. 87 This
language would seem to preclude waiver by such documents as the
United Nations Charter88 or the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights89 because they fail to discuss immunity. Nevertheless, the
commitment to provide domestic enforcement of human rights which
is central to these documents, 90 should relieve the parties of the right
to claim immunity when they not only fail to provide a forum for the
83. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1604, 1605(a)(1) (1976). If the tort occurs in the United
States, victims can bring suit under section 1605(a)(5).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
85. Id. § 1605(a)(1).
86. Brief of Plaintiffs in Support of Default Judgment, Siderman de Blake v. Ar-
gentina, No. 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. 1984).
87. HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 18.
88. UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.
89. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 3 U.N. GAOR, C.3 Annexes
(Agenda Item 58) 535, 536-41, U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948).
90. The International Court of Justice, interpreting article 56 of the United Na-
tions Charter, held that the failure of a member state to promote fundamental human
rights is a "flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter." Legal Con-
sequences for the Status of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-
west Africa) Notwithstanding Security Counsel Resolution 1970 I.C.J 28, 57 (Advisory
Opinion). Similarly, article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note
89, states that "everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by
law." As President Carter stated in his address to the United Nations on March 17,
1977:
All the signatories of the United Nations Charter have pledged themselves to
observe and to respect basic human rights. Thus, no member of the United
Nations can claim that mistreatment of their citizens is solely its own business.
Equally no member can avoid its responsibilities to review and to speak when
torture or unwarranted deprivation occurs in any part of the world.
Reprinted in 78 DEP'T ST. BULL. 322 (1977).
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victim of torture, but are the actual perpetrators of the torture.91
Such waiver is needed to provide at least a minimal level of deter-
rence to state-sponsored torture.
The primary objection to incorporating international human rights
agreements is that such agreements are not self-executing. Thus,
"implementing legislation" is required to create a private right of
action based upon international agreements.92
Human rights advocates do not propose this application of interna-
tional agreements. Whether the international agreements evidence
the customs and usages of civilized nations for purposes of ascertain-
ing international law93 or are used as an implicit waiver of sovereign
immunity, the advocates argue that such applications do not trigger
the enforcement of a nonself-executing treaty. However, there is no
need to base a new private right of action upon international law
when torture is considered a violation of the offending sovereign
country's own constitutional law as well as international law, which
is recognized by the law of the United States.94 Nevertheless, the
91. See generally R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAWS, PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 73-79 (1979); Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 18;
Paust, Laws of the Nation v. Laws of the Land, 10 HUM. RTS. 40 (1982); Comment, The
Domestic Application of International Human Rights Law: Evolving the Species, 5 HAS-
TINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 161 (1981).
92. Further legislation is usually required to create a private right of action based
on the treaty or convention when, and if, the individual state deems appropriate. Unfor-
tunately, however, there is no clearly defined rule to this effect, as evidenced in Frolova v.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985); ("Whether a
treaty is self-executing is an issue for judicial interpretation, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 154(1) (1965), and courts consider
several factors in discerning the intent of the parties to the agreement. . . ."). While this
issue is too broad for a thorough discussion in this Comment, several extensive treat-
ments of the self-executing treaty issue are available. See D'AMATO. THE CONCEPT OF
CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 5 (1971); Burke, Application of International
Human Rights Law in State and Federal Courts, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 291 (1983); Rusk,
A Comment on Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, I1 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 311 (1981); Com-
ment, The Domestic Application of International Human Rights Law: Evolving the Spe-
cies, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 161 (1981).
93. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876 (per the Supreme Court's instruction in The Pa-
quette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D.
Kan. 1980), affid sub. nom. on other grounds Rodriquez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654
F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981)). See generally Blum & Steinhardt supra note 18 at 73,
citing Sohn, The Shaping of International Law, 8 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1 (1978).
94. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.
(5 Wheat.) 153 (1820); D'Amato, Agora: What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers?, 79 AM. J.
INT'L LAW, 92, 101 n.21 (1985) (D'Amato estimates 5,000 cases in American law that
turn on rights founded in international law); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino
Receivor, 376 U.S. 398, 451-53 & nn.12-15 (1964) (White, J., dissenting) (citing exten-
sive authority for the obligation of federal courts to apply international law). See also
Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101
specific language of the Immunities Act's legislative history implic-
itly precludes such incorporation of international agreements under
section 1604.
The second basis upon which to find redress for human rights vio-
lations under the Immunities Act, as an explicit or implied waiver of
immunity under section 1605(a)(1), has been interpreted narrowly
by the courts. Congress expressed two methods of explicit waiver in
the Immunities Act's legislative history: 1) agreement to arbitrate or
to be subject to the laws of another country; and 2) filing a respon-
sive pleading without raising the defense of sovereign immunity.9 5
The case history follows this language closely, finding implicit
waiver when a nation has agreed to arbitrate or has specifically
waived immunity in a treaty.98 However, the courts have upheld im-
munity where the treaty waiver applies only to certain limited acts, 97
or when the only contact with the United States is a contract under
which the sovereign has not knowingly relinquished a legal right.98
An example of the courts' hesitancy toward waiving sovereign im-
munity on the basis of a treaty is found in Jafari v. Islamic Republic
of Iran.09 Iran had signed an economic treaty with the United States
waiving immunity for commercial enterprises between the two coun-
tries. The court held that the waiver reasonably could not be ex-
tended to the nations themselves under section 1605(a)(1) of the Im-
munities Act.100 Yet, this case should not be construed to bar human
rights claims of waiver which are based upon international law.
Jafari was a commercial claim attempting to base jurisdiction on a
U. PA. L. REv. 26, 27-30 (1952). (framers of the Constitution expressly or implicitly
accepted international law in its entirety as a part of United States national law); Sprout,
Theories as to the Applicability of International Law in the Federal Courts of the
United States, 1932 Am. J. INT'L L. 280, 285-87 (acceptance of international law and
provision for its local judicial enforcement considered essential conditions for a state's
admission to the family of nations). But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied 105 S.Ct. 1354 (1985)
(according to Judge Bork, neither international law nor the ATCA provide litigants with
a private right of action). Although this restrictive stance is unprecedented, it has drawn
a great deal of attention. See, e.g., Defendant's Brief, Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568
F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983). Contra D'Amato, Agora: What Does Tel-Oren Tell Law-
yers?, 79 AM. J. INT'L LAW 92 (1985); Cole, Challenging Covert War: The Politics of
the Political Question Doctrine, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 155, 175 n.103 (1985).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976).
96. HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 18.
97. lpitrade Int'l, S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C.
1978); Libyan Am. Oil v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175
(D.D.C. 1980), vacated, 684 F.2d 1032 (1981); Birch Shipping v. Embassy of United
Republic, 507 F. Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 1980); Behring Int'l., Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air
Force, 475 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1979).
98. Chicago Bridge v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. Ill.
1980); Mashayekhi v. Iran, 515 F. Supp. 41 (D.D.C. 1980); see also Canadian Transp.
Co. v. United States, 633 F.2d 1081 (D.D.C. 1980).
99. 539 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
100. Id. at 211.
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narrowly drawn commercial treaty of limited application. However,
many treaties and international agreements prohibit established vio-
lations of international law10' and could act together to create a
valid basis for jurisdiction. "The newer mode [of international law-
making] sees international instruments not as necessarily binding by
themselves, but as incremental building blocks of an order which can
be seen with increasing clarity as the number and authoritativeness
of supporting instruments mount.' 0 2 Such use of human rights doc-
uments has precedent. In Filartiga, the court characterized official
torture as a violation of international law on just such an accumula-
tion of international law based upon proscriptions against torture.
03
The Present Status of Human Rights Claims
In summary, most United States courts regard the Immunities
Act as the exclusive means of obtaining jurisdiction over foreign sov-
ereigns. The few exceptions to immunity under the Immunities Act
may be construed liberally to permit human rights causes of action
against foreign sovereigns. The ATCA provides for adjudication of
international law claims; sovereign states, however, as common
human rights defendants, are often protected by sovereign immunity.
Courts may be willing to construe the Immunities Act more liberally
in the future with decisional precedent such as De Letelier,'0 4 Verlin-
den, 0 5 and Siderman.10 6 Yet, the adoption of a specific, unambigu-
101. See e.g., Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, reprinted in 48 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE
DROIT PENAL 269 (1977); UNITED NATIONS CHARTER; Slavery Convention, Sept. 25,
1926, 46 Stat. 2183, T.S. No. 778 (entered into force Mar. 9, 1927); Supplementary
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices
Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, T.I.A.S. No. 6418, 266 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force Apr. 30, 1957); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into
force Jan. 12, 1951); Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor (ILO No.
105), adopted June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (entered into force Jan. 17, 1959);
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, OAS T.S. No. 36, OAS O.R.
OEA/ Ser.A/16 [English] (entered into force July 18, 1978); Draft Convention for the
Prevention and Suppression of Torture, arts. 1, 4, 9, reprinted in 48 REVUE INTERNATI-
ONALE DE DROIT PENAL 269 (1977).
102. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 18 at 73 (citing Sohn, The Shaping of Inter-
national Law, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1978)).
103. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
104. De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 748
F.2d 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2656 (1985). See also text accompa-
nying note 40.
105. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983). See supra
note 42 and accompanying text.
106. Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal.
ous amendment to the Immunities Act would resolve the confusion
created by the coexisting ATCA and Immunities Act legislation.
PROVIDING REDRESS FOR TORTURE VICTIMS
The Proscription Against Torture
The United States Department of State declared that transgres-
sions of human rights are not matters within a state's exclusive do-
mestic jurisdiction. 10 7 Rather, human rights violations are proper
claims for suit in United States courts, when, as with torture,108
there is a consensus in the international community that the right is
protected.109 Torture is prohibited by every major multilateral
human rights treaty10 and is prohibited by the constitutions of 112
1984).
107. Reflection of the recent growth of international human rights law is gen-
eral agreement within the international legal community that transgressions of
human rights are not matters within a state's exclusive domestic jurisdiction and
accordingly that the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs does not bar
one state from taking action designed to promote respect for human rights in
another.
Memorandum of Law: U.S. Government's Obligations Regarding Human Rights of Indi-
viduals Outside the United States (Aug. 23, 1972), reprinted in International Protection
of Human Rights: The Work of International Organizations and the Role of U.S. For-
eign Policy, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and
Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 67-68
(1973).
108. It is important to distinguish torture from terrorism. While there is a univer-
sal abhorrence of torture (see infra notes 109-111), terrorism is considered a viable
means of aggression by many nations. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 18, at 77 n.99. See
also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards,
J., concurring), cert. denied 105 S.Ct. 1354-55 (1985) ("While this nation unequivocally
condemns all terrorist attacks, that sentiment is not universal. Indeed, the nations of the
world are so divisively split on the legitimacy of such aggression as to make it impossible
to pinpoint an area of harmony or consensus."). This lack of consensus precludes a suit
for terrorist acts under the ATCA. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964) (tradition requires a high standard of mutual assent between civilized nations
before a rule may be said to be part of the law of nations). See also Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d
at 806-07 (Bork, J., concurring). Furthermore, most acts of terrorism are perpetrated by
political organizations or religious sects rather than recognized nations, again precluding
suit under the ATCA. See e.g., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 774. See also Whitaker & Ander-
son, An Odyssey of Terror, NEWSWEEK, June 24, 1985, at 20 (President Amin Gemayel
of Lebanon disavowed any official association with the Shiite Moslem hostage situation
of June 1985).
109. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980), citing Brief of
Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 604 (1980). It should
be noted that this brief by the State Department was filed during the Carter Administra-
tion. "In the political sphere, the human rights policies of Jimmy Carter have given way
to the realpolitik of the Reagan Administration." D'Amato, The Concept of Human
Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110, 1110 (1982).
110. See e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5(2), OAS T.S. No.
36, at I, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser 4 vol. II 23, doc. 21, rev. 2 (1975); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7. U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 2200 (XXI)A, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 3, Council of Europe, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (1968), 213
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nations."1' There is not a single nation which officially asserts a right
to torture its nationals." 2 In Filartiga, the court concluded that
state-sponsored torture is prohibited by international law, with no
distinctions between treatment of aliens and citizens."13 Because of
this consensus, it is argued that sovereigns have implicitly given up
the right to claim immunity when they commit any acts of
torture.
14
Torture becomes "institutionalized" when the perpetrators are
protected from prosecution.1 5 Neither the World Court,"' the
United Nations Security Council," 7 nor national tribunals," 8 pres-
ently provide a viable forum for torture victims. If the United States
intends to live up to its human rights commitments, it must act to
guarantee a forum for these victims.
Amending the Immunities Act
Sovereign immunity is not guaranteed by the Constitution; rather,
it is a matter of legislative grace and comity allowed at the discre-
tion of Congress." 9 In its Filartiga brief, the United States Depart-
ment of State declared that enforcement of human rights would not
impair United States foreign policy efforts, but rather would pre-
serve the credibility of the United States commitment to protect
human rights.'
20
The United States, once a leader in the protection of human
rights' 2' has been accused of turning its back on the tradition of
U.N.T.S. 211.
I 11. Against Torture, An Amnesty International Briefing, in AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL, TORTURE IN THE EIGHTIES 5 (1984).
112. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Filartiga, supra note 109, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585,
598.
113. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876.
114. R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 91, at 73-79. See generally Blum &
Steinhardt, supra note 18; Paust, supra note 91.
115. Against Torture, An Amnesty International Briefing, supra note 111, at 1.
116. D'Amato, supra note 94, at 119 (the World Court has no viable means of
enforcement of its judgments).
117. Id. at 122 (the Security Council is rendered impotent by the discretionary
veto, which allows any member-state to bar the majority's judgment).
118. In those cases thus far brought in United States courts (Filartiga and
Siderman), the plaintiff's national tribunal failed to provide a hearing, thereby violating
voluntary treaty guarantees.
119. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (citing
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812)).
120. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Filartiga, supra note 109, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585,
604 (1980).
121. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was created, fought
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protectionism it helped to establish. 22 There is concern that human
rights suits against foreign sovereigns will make the United States
vulnerable to retaliatory suits by foreign countries.123 One scholar
suggests that nations will attempt to avoid United States courts by
reducing their commercial activity with this country.1
2 4
These concerns, though not unfounded, are neither new nor
unique. Many have previously appeared as attacks on the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity; however, sovereign immunity waiver is
now recognized world-wide.125 Concerns over United States vulnera-
bility are valid only in the unlikely event that the United States
practices official torture. Further, because it is the sovereign state
which is held liable for official torture, individual American citizens
would not be legitimate defendants in foreign-based torture claims.
The United States does not want to expose itself to liability for its
support of unpopular governments. The concerns regarding this vul-
nerability are valid, as evidenced by the International Court of Jus-
tice case brought by Nicaragua against the United States for illegal
activities in violation of\ international law. 28 However, nations have
yet to agree on the right to sue under international law. 27 At this
time, nothing protects the United States from suit in a foreign
court. 28 Although United States courts may dismiss a politically
sensitive case as a nonjusticiable political question, 29 international
comity has not been effective in preventing such cases from proceed-
for and presented to the United Nations by the United States delegation headed by Elea-
nor Roosevelt. G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. 1/777 (1948).
122. Franck, Icy Day at the ICJ, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 379, 379 (1985) ("With that
[withdrawal from the proceedings initiated by Nicaragua], the U.S. Government turned
its back not only on the International Court of Justice but on 40 years of leadership in
the cause of world peace through law.").
123. Case Comment, Torture as a Tort in Violation of International Law: Pena
Irala, 33 STAN. L. REV. 353, 359 (1981); Note, supra note 42, at 485 n.144. For exam-
ple, it is argued that the United States has failed to ratify the Genocide Treaty since
1951 because the Senate did not want to expose American citizens to suits in foreign
countries. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
124. Note, supra note 42, at 485. However, this would be an unlikely response by
the perpetrator of torture, whether individual or sovereign.
125. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. See also Singer, Abandoning
Restrictive Sovereign Immunity: An Analysis in Terms of Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 26
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1985).
126. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States) Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26).
For a discussion of United States policy towards Nicaragua, see Comment, The Legal
Implications of United States Policy Towards Nicaragua: A Machiavellian Dilemma 22
SAN DIEGo L. REv. 899 (1985).
127. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ed-
wards, J., concurring), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1354-55 (1985).
128. See, e.g., supra note 126 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (United States
activities in El Salvador); Sanchez-Espinosa v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983),
affd 770 F.2d 202 (1985) (United States activities in Nicaragua).
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ing in foreign tribunals. 130 For these reasons, vulnerability to judicial
retribution is no new threat. Foreign nations will not find it more
politically expedient to sue the United States in the future because
we have amended the Immunities Act to allow for torture claims.
Additionally, there is a concern that United States courts and
Congress are not equipped to involve themselves in an assessment of
a foreign government's political activities.' 3' This argument is not
persuasive. For years Congress has risked aggravating United States
vulnerability, and has undertaken repeatedly to assess the political
activities of foreign sovereigns through the enforcement of financial
aid and trade sanctions against states which violate human rights.
32
This legislation "indicate[s] that the President and Congress [place]
a high priority on human rights, even at the expense of potentially
harmful diplomatic consequences."1 33
A Proposed Amendment
This Comment proposes an amendment to the Immunities Act
which would provide for a narrow, unambiguous human rights cause
of action. 34 Such an exception to section 1605(a)(6) of the Immuni-
130. For example, the United States helped to establish a court in Nicaragua, but
twice refused to recognize decisions from that court that went against United States
interests (in 1912 and 1916). W. LAFEBER, INEVITABLE REVOLUTIONS 41 (rev. ed. 1984).
See also supra note 126.
131. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1354-55 (1985). See generally Comment, Suits by Foreigners
Against Foreign States in United States Courts: A Selective Expansion of Jurisdiction,
90 YALE L.J. 1861 (1981).
132. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (Supp. II
1979) ("Except under circumstances specified in this section, no security assistance may
be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.").
133. See generally Bilder, Integrating Human Rights Law into Domestic
Law-U.S. Experience, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981); Lillich, Role of Domestic Courts
in Enforcing International Human Rights Law, 1980 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 20. But
c.f. Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 421 (1979).
134. The proposed amendment would, if enacted, fall under 28 U.S.C. § 1605.
General Exceptions to the Jurisdiction Immunity of a Foreign State:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case-
(6) in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for official acts
of torture, genocide, or slavery. The victim must first have sought and been
refused a hearing on this violation in the national tribunals of the country of
his or her citizenship.
Proposed § 1603 Definitions:
For purposes of this chapter:
ties Act would establish jurisdiction and a private right of action in
cases of torture, genocide, or slavery, where plaintiffs first had
sought and been refused a hearing in the victim's native country, or
in the forum where the crime occurred. 135 Definitions of torture, ge-
nocide, and slavery should be included under section 1603 of the Im-
munities Act.
Jurists on both sides of the ATCA debate have manipulated judi-
cial doctrines to support their particular viewpoint. 3 6 An amend-
ment would eliminate such speculation by specifically prohibiting
enumerated acts, that is, torture, genocide, and slavery, rather than
(0 "torture" includes any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether phys-
ical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public
official on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or other persons.
(g) "genocide" includes acts calculated to bring about the physical destruction
of a national, ethic, racial or religious group,
(h) "slavery" is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of
the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.
135. This would provide an alternative to suit under the ATCA and thus eliminate
the need to argue that the ATCA provides a private right of action. See Tel Oren, 726
F.2d at 775 (Edwards, J., concurring).
136. For a sharply defined assessment of this conflict, consider the split in the Sec-
ond Circuit as reflected in Filartiga, HIT and Dreyfus, and also the split between judges
in the D.C. Circuit case of Tel-Oren. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980); lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534
F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 774. The points of debate surrounding the
ATCA include the definition of international law (Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880, cites
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820): "The law of nations
-. may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public
laws; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing
and enforcing that law." The Filartiga court then went on to find torture a violation
pursuant to these authorities, saying that the ATCA includes only those acts which rise
to a level of international significance or involve well-established, universally recognized
norms of international law. Id. See also Zapata v. Quinn, 564 F. Supp. 23 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), affid, 707 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1983) (analyzing Filartiga). On the other hand, in
Dreyfus, 534 F.2d at 30-31 and lIT, 519 F.2d at 1015, it was argued that international
law applies to the relationship "among nations," rather than individuals, and cannot en-
compass a state's treatment of its own citizens. Similarly, in the "custom v. convention"
debate, some scholars contend that international law should be based on the practice of
nations rather than based on what nations preach. The RESTATEMENT (REvIsED) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS § 102(2) (Tenth Draft No. 1, 1980), defines customary international
law as the result of countries following a general and consistent practice out of a sense of
legal obligation. Because incidents of torture have been cited in 98 countries in the 1980s
(Against Torture, An Amnesty International Briefing, supra note 111, at 1), it is argued
that the "consistent practice" reflects an international view that torture is legal rather
than illegal. Although this argument was refuted in Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880, it contin-
ues to be raised. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 65. See also I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (3d ed. 1979). In Tel-Oren, Judge Edwards sup-
ported the Filartiga definition, stating "the 'law of nations' is not stagnant and should be
construed as it exists today among the nations of the world." Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 777.
Judge Bork argued conversely, that the ATCA drafters only intended three violations of
international law: violation of safe-conducts, infringement of rights of ambassadors, and
piracy (recognized by Blackstone), and that only these support a private right of action
under the ATCA. Id. at 778.
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broadly defined torts as international law violations. Because the pro-
hibited acts must be official, no American citizen would be made
vulnerable to suit merely by visiting a foreign country.137 Suit by a
foreign state or citizen against the United States would arise under
this amendment only if the United States government "officially"
committed the alleged crimes; mere association with an offending
sovereign would not create United States liability. Another limita-
tion to United States liability is the threshold requirement that re-
dress be unavailable to victims in their native country. Although Ar-
gentina"3 8 and Paraguay 39 have previously failed to provide a
national tribunal in torture cases, it is hoped that this would not oc-
cur in the United States.
Such an amendment would provide the United States with an op-
portunity to continue as a leader in the cause of international human
rights. Congressional debate regarding adoption of the amendment
would provide a much needed forum for expressions of interest by
both the legislative and executive branches. The judiciary, having
struggled in a vain attempt to gauge the appropriate measure of
United States involvement in international human rights protection,
should welcome commentary and analysis from the political
branches on this sensitive issue. The courts cannot effectuate fair
and consistent adjudication of human rights claims because of ex-
isting legislative ambiguity. Clarification from Congress will promote
the United States role in defining and protecting international
human rights.
CONCLUSION
Victims of torture refused protection by their native judiciary de-
serve redress. International tribunals presently offer no effective re-
course for victims of international human rights violations. In the
United States, the Immunities Act controls as the exclusive means to
establish jurisdiction over defendant sovereigns, yet it was not
designed to accommodate human rights causes of action. The United
States can, nevertheless, continue its vigilant tradition as a protector
of human rights by amending the Immunities Act. Rather than
abandon our history as a friend to oppressed citizens of the world,
137. See Case Comment, supra note 123; Note, supra note 42, at 485 n.l 14.
138. See Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, No. CV 82- 1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D.
Cal. 1984).
139. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
the United States courts should continue to provide a forum for the
victims of egregious violations of international law.
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